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FORCIBLE TRESPASS TO PERSONAL
PROPERTY
DAVID J. SHARPE*
In contrast to forcible trespass to real property, there is no case
authority for the existence of forcible trespass to personal property
in England,' and Chief Justice Ruffin said in 1837 that he found no
authority in any textbook for it.' But this is not to suggest that
forcible trespass to personal property was made up one day by the
North Carolina Supreme Court out of whole cloth. The principle
of an indictable trespass, a trespass with a strong hand against a
person presently in possession of property, was firmly established in
the English real property cases. And given the principle, there was
no reason to confine its operation to real property. Forcible trespass
to personal property was in use in North Carolina as early as 1792 ;3
and the North Carolina court, while regarding forcible trespass to
personal property as confined to this state,4 has never shown concern
whether the crime existed, or if so, upon what authority; rather, the
court has toiled in its opinions to articulate the elements of the crime
and the proper scope of its operation.5
The distinction in forcible trespass between real and personal
property rests upon clear authority. In State v. Graves' the property
in question was a boundary fence, but the indictment described the
* Assistant Professor of Law, The George Washington University.
'Compare Sharpe, Forcible Trespass to Real Property, 39 N.C.L. REv.
121-125 (1961).2 State v. Love, 19 N.C. 267 (1837).
3 State v. White, 2 N.C. 13 (Super. Ct. 1792).
'State v. Love, 19 N.C. 267 (1837).
'The term "forcible trespass" seems to have been first used in 1830 in
State v. Mills, 13 N.C. 420 (1830). The earliest case on forcible trespass
to personal property, State v. White, 2 N.C. 13 (Super. Ct. 1792), spoke of
"indictment for trespass," a phrase which was repeated in two subsequent
important cases. State v. Trexler, 4 N.C. 188 (1815) ; State v. Flowers, 6
N.C. 225 (1813). "Indictable trespass" was used in State v. Simpson, 12
N.C. 504 (1828). Since 1830 "forcible trespass" has been used consistently
and exclusively in the criminal cases. A later attempt to confine "forcible
trespass" to personal property and use "forcible entry" for real property
originated in State v. Jacobs, 94 N.C. 950 (1886), was regarded as an
occasional usage in State v. Davis, 109 N.C. 809, 13 S.E. 883 (1891), and
was last mentioned in dictum in State v. Austin, 123 N.C. 749, 31 S.E. 731(1898). It cannot be taken seriously as law and it would not be convenient
usage for this discussion.674 N.C. 396 (1876).
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fence as personal property. Although the court held that the indict-
ment was good in form, it ruled that the evidence offered did not
support the indictment for a forcible trespass to personal property:
the fence, which was real property, was taken down and carried.
away in a continuous transaction.
This distinction should not be read as separating forcible trespass.
into two crimes. To be sure, the distinction between real and per-
sonal property was quite significant in prosecutions for larceny-it
meant the difference between life and death for the defendant, who.
could be hanged for larceny if a fence were found to be personal
property. But if the fence were real property, the defendant was at
most guilty of a misdemeanor (usually of malicious mischief) ; and'
quite probably he was guilty only of a civil trespass. Plainly this.
distinction has nothing to do with forcible trespass, which is a.
common law misdemeanor,' punishable by fine or imprisonment or
both." For another thing, drawing a firm distinction between
forcible trespasses to real and personal property is false to the tradi-
tion of forcible trespass, the chief virtue of which has always been
freedom from the technical refinements of property law. Indeed,
there are cases, clearly on forcible trespass, in which it is not possible-
to say from the opinion whether the property was real or personal.
For example, in State v. Simpson9 the defendants made off with both
gathered corn and standing corn which they severed themselves. The-
indictment charged only forcible trespass in taking "one bushel of
corn," but nothing was made of the potential distinction, and the-
conviction was affirmed.
Frequently both types of property are involved-a forcible tres-
pass to one's personal property while he is on his own real property
is quite possible. Whether this would constitute two crimes has.
never been squarely decided.' ° It would seem that there is no
merger of one property in the other, and provided there is a trespass.
to each type of property, it should be possible to indict for two.
forcible trespasses.
Today it would seem that mistaking the distinction between real
and personal property would not be fatal to an indictment under
" State v. Mills, 13 N.C. 420 (1830); State v. Arrington, 7 N.C. 571.(1819).8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-3 (1953). 12 N.C. 504 (1828).
"0 See State v. Sneed, 84 N.C. 816 (1881), where the forcible trespass.
indictment charged both unroofing a man's house and throwing his furniture
into the dooryard.
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G.S. § 15-153," which prescribes a tolerant attitude for the courts
in weighing formal errors: the purpose of describing property is
only to put the defendant on notice of his alleged crime; the identity
of the property is the essential element rather than its legal char-
acterization; and forcible trespass has never been formally split into
two separate crimes. The moral of State v. Graves seems to be
that the particular property should be named as specifically as
possible, but not characterized in the indictment as real or personal.
As a matter of analytical convenience, however, there is con-
siderable reason for treating forcible trespasses to real and personal
property separately. The analogies and confusions of forcible tres-
pass to real property with forcible entry and detainer and with entry
after being forbidden have already been dealt with at length.'" But
the analogies and influences of forcible trespass to personal property
have been felt in the law of larceny and robbery, and to some extent
in the area of punitive damages for civil assault-quite different
areas. Such a divergence of analogies seems to justify the separate
treatments accorded forcible trespass by these two articles.
ANALYSIS
Defining forcible trespass to personal property tersely but com-
pletely is not easy. The court has occasionally tried a definition,"
and opinions have given a few indictments charging the crime. 4
This composite definition is offered as reasonably compatible with
the cases and sustained by the analysis which follows: Forcible
trespass to personal property is a trespass to personal property, in
the peaceful possession of another, with sufficient force to breach the
peace.15
Force: The Aspect of Assault
Forcible trespass is a mixed crime which consists of a trespass
"
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-153 (1953). It must be admitted, however, that
this same statute, which dates from 1545, 37 Hen. 8, c. 8, was in force at the
time of State v. Graves, 74 N.C. 396 (1876).
" See Sharpe, supra note 1, at 144-152.
"3 See, e.g., State v. Pearman, 61 N.C. 371 (1867).
" See, e.g., State v. Elrod, 28 N.C. 250, 251 (1846): "The indictment
charged, that the defendant with force and arms, and with a strong hand,
unlawfully took and carried away a mare from the possession of one David
Miller, against the will of said Miller, who was then and there present, for-
bidding the same."
" Time is not of the essence in forcible trespass and it need not be alleged.
State v. Caudle, 63 N.C. 30 (1868).
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to property in someone's possession and an assault to the possessing
person. 16 Understanding the aspect of assault in forcible trespass
usually resolves the problem of choosing the proper person to name
as victim in the indictment. In a larceny prosecution it is of the
utmost importance to lay the "property in the goods" in the person
in possession, but such possession as a question of property law
can be either actual and present or quite remote and only con-
structive-indeed, most larcenies are committed in the absence
of the possessor. But in forcible trespass, right to possess is
irrelevant; present possession is the controlling factor, so long as the
possession is peaceful.
For example, two children, James Somers and a slave, were in
McDowell's field, which was five hundred yards away from James's
sister, Sarah, who apparently owned the slave. McDowell took
possession of the slave in spite of what resistance young James
could offer. The forcible trespass indictment of McDowell laid the
possession in Sarah. The conviction was reversed for a new trial
because the proof showed that James was in possession.' 7  Analyti-
cally, the assault was directed at James, and therefore his sister's
ownership, which the court made plain would have controlled in a
civil action for trespass, was irrelevant.
One case appears to be flatly opposed to this analysis. A girl,
thirteen, and a boy, eleven, were playing in the dooryard of the
owner of a fierce dog. The defendant shot and killed the dog in
front of the children while the owner was in a far distant field. In
reversing the conviction for forcible trespass, the court said that a
forcible trespass could only be committed in the presence of the
dog's owner.' If the opinion is an accurate reflection of the court's
thought, the case is an anomaly. 9 The easy explanation of the case,
however, is to note that although the children bore the same surname
as the owner of the dog, neither the special verdict nor the opinion
1 The "occupancy" of real property denoted the possessory relationship
of the person assaulted to the property upon which the defendant trespassed.
See Sharpe, supra note 1, at 126-27. In connection with personal property,
the word "possession" will be used, accompanied throughout by the warning
that it means the bare fact of peaceful control, without embracing any of
the legal attributes of right to control involved in title.
"? State v. McDowell, 8 N.C. 449 (1821).
1 State v. Phipps, 32 N.C. 17 (1848).
" The opinion does not cite State v. McDowell, 8 N.C. 449 (1821), and
the reliance put on State v. Mills, 13 N.C. 420 (1830), is more literal than
can be justified by the facts.
1962]
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said that they were his children. If they were not his children, even
though they were in the owner's yard they were not in possession of
his independent-minded dog, and it would not be correct to lay the
possession in them. This reading of the facts may be supported by
the concluding sentence of the opinion: "The special verdict shows
that James Perry [the owner] and wife were absent in the field at
work, and it does not show that any member of his family was
present.
20
Another opinion 2 upheld a conviction through the unique and
rather clumsy device of making a son, present and defending the
possession of corn locked in a crib, his father's agent. As a question
of trespass, laying the possession in the father was correct since the
son had no possession of his own as against the father; but as a ques-
tion of assault, the assault upon the son was not a vicarious assault
-upon the father, and the indictment therefore should probably have
been quashed.
It should be possible generally to solve the parent-child problem
and other relational situations by taking forcible trespass as a
simple concept of fact, uncluttered with rules of ownership beyond
bare possession. Then a child old enough to be both presently in
possession of property-depending somewhat upon the nature of the
property-and put in fear by an assault could be named in an in-
dictment as the possessor, without regard for the undisputed fact
that ownership lay in his parent. Surely the public peace protects
children against assault and trespass no less than it protects their
elders when they happen to be present.22
As for the definition of "presence" in the sense of propinquity
of the trespasser to his victim, there are no forcible trespass cases
on how close the trespasser must be to his victim in order to put
him in reasonable fear of a battery, but the abundant cases on the
classic form of indictable assault are directly applicable.
23
On the closeness required between victim and property, however,
there are several forcible trespass cases. If the property is too far
separated from the victim, the result of the defendant's conduct will
be, not forcible trespass, but an indictable assault and perhaps a civil
"0 State v. Phipps, 32 N.C. 17, 19 (1848).
" State v. Drake, 60 N.C. 238 (1864).
"A gratuitous bailee was properly named as in possession in State v.
Pearman, 61 N.C. 371 (1867).
2
'E.g., State v. Martin, 85 N.C. 508 (1881).
(Vol. 40
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trespass. Fairly recently it has been held that there was no forcible
trespass when a finance company agent repossessed a truck from the
street in front of the would-be victim's house.24 No one was present
when the truck was entered and driven off, and hence it was im-
possible to imagine an assault.
The extent of the victim's "presence" seems to depend to some
-extent upon the nature of the property and its capacity to be pos-
sessed. A banknote, for example, can easily be held in the hand,
but it is still within one's presence while it is in easy reach. Hence
when a rough-and-tumble fight was being carried on over the pos-
session of a banknote within the owner's bedroom, the owner did not
need to touch the banknote in order to charge a forcible trespass
against it. The court made much of the fact that the banknote was
in sight, never out of reach, and was "to every substantial purpose
reduced to possession .... ,"2 This language seems consonant with
the concept in robbery that "presence" of the victim does not require
continual control of the property so far as its nature permits, and
-certainly not physical touching.20
It follows that if victim and property are far separated, it makes
no difference how violent the trespass to property alone may be;
there is no assault to the victim, and hence there can be no forcible
trespass. For example, a slave girl was forcibly detained while
trespassing on the defendant's land, which was about a quarter mile
from her mistress's house. In attempting to rescue the slave, the
mistress had to trespass upon the defendant's land herself. The
-court found that the defendant had not committed a forcible trespass
in taking possession of the slave.2
The required propinquity of victim and property is often de-
scribed in terms of "presence and forbidding." Forbidding a tres-
pass to a distant field from within a farmhouse is too far away, but
repeating the forbidding from the field itself has been held sufficient
to render criminal the subsequent trespassory removal of seven
stacks of fodder.' And a person can order his servants to commit
" State v. Stinnett, 203 N.C. 829, 167 S.E. 63 (1933).
" State v. Trexler, 4 N.C. 188, 191 (1815). (Emphasis is by the court.)
" No North Carolina robbery case seems to have turned upon this point,
'but the doctrine is generally accepted in the Anglo-American law of robbery.
See, e.g., Annot., 123 A.L.R. 1099 (1939).
" State v. Flowers, 6 N.C. 225 (1813).
"' State v. Surles, 74 N.C. 330 (1876).
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the required assault and thereby vicariously move himself close
enough to the victim and property to be guilty of forcible trespass.29
Force: The Concept of Possession
The term "peaceful possession" used in the composite definition
of forcible trespass means literally what it says. For example, a
bailee, given possession of a bale of cotton by two of three tenants
in common, was held not guilty of a forcible trespass in forcibly
refusing to turn it over to the third tenant in common, who as a
matter of property law probably had the right of immediate posses-
sion as against the bailee.8° Still, the third tenant in common had
no right as against the public to breach the peace in order to vindi-
cate or exercise her property rights. Moreover, she was probably
guilty of forcible trespass against the bailee. A trespasser himself
may be in peaceful possession of goods, and if he defends his posses-
sion forcibly, even against the owner, he is not guilty of forcible
trespass.31 Of course some period of uncontested possession must
elapse before possession of the trespasser attaches. It would suggest
that might makes legal right to admit that a fresh trespassory taking,
contested at the time or shortly thereafter, gave immediate possession
in the taker which the law should defend. 2 On the other hand, due
concern for the public peace should remit the victim to processes of
the law rather than self-help after some lapse of time, when the
wrongdoer's possession has been firmly established.
Peaceful possession is not necessarily conferred, however, by a
taking without force. For example, where a trespasser took in his
hand a banknote within reach of his victim, and then forcibly
prevented the victim from retaking it, the court rightly held that the
trespasser was never in peaceful possession and affirmed his con-
viction for forcible trespass.33 In the same line of thought, a man
committed a forcible trespass by surreptitiously cutting the rope by
'
9 Ibid.
o State v. Marsh, 64 N.C. 378 (1870).
3' State v. Flowers, 6 N.C. 225 (1813). See also Sharpe, supra note 1,
at 122.
"A man may defend his property with force reasonably proportioned to
the need, so long as neither death nor serious bodily harm is threatened.
Curlee v. Scales, 200 N.C. 612, 158 S.E. 89 (1931).
" State v. Trexler, 4 N.C. 188 (1815). If the trespasser is considered as
never having acquired possession, the fiction of trespass ab initio with regard
to forcible trespass to personal property may be escaped. Justice Clark
mentioned, but did not adopt, the fiction in State v. Gray, 109 N.C. 790, 14
S.E. 55 (1891). Compare Sharpe, supra note 1, at 138-139.
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which his victim led a horse, taking possession of the horse himself,
and defending his possession against his victim by brandishing a
drawn knife and a large stone.34
The trespassory taking and the force subsequently exerted are
regarded in the law as one transaction.35  In 1874 this question
received its severest test. The defendants demanded a cow from
the victim, who went away to find the man who he claimed had sold
him the cow. The defendants had driven the cow some three
hundred feet down the road before the victim returned to forbid the
taking. Here the court found the defendants guilty of a forcible
trespass, although the rationale of peaceful possession was not ex-
pressly used.30
The sufficiency of alleging possession in the forcible trespass
indictment has been tested in several cases. An indictment charging
that the defendants "did seize, arrest, and take from" the victim cer-
tain slaves was held to charge that the slaves were in the victim's
possession.31 The court was careful to point out, however, that the
proof must show that there was actual and not merely constructive
possession. The word "possession" alone is not sufficient to give
notice that actual possession will be proved,38 and presence in posses-
sion cannot be inferred from an allegation of trespass with a strong
hand or numbers of persons.39 However, the expressions "actual
possession ''4 and "presence"'" have been approved, and when both
presence and the trespass with a strong hand are alleged, "no assault
need appear in the indictment."'42
Force: The Quantum of Force
Alleging or proving only a technical trespass vi et armis is fatal
to a forcible trespass prosecution: the force alleged and proved must
", State v. Love, 19 N.C. 267 (1837).
" "[I]t is certain that the doctrine of forcible detainer has never been
extended to personal property." State v. Marsh, 64 N.C. 378, 379 (1870).
At common law it never extended to real property either, although it was
discussed extensively. See Sharpe, supra note 1, at 140-41.
, State v. McAdden, 71 N.C. 207 (1874).
, State v. Mills, 13 N.C. 420 (1830).
s State v. Love, 19 N.C. 267 (1837).
o State v. Mills, 13 N.C. 420 (1830).
40 State v. McDowell, 8 N.C. 449 (1821).
"State v. Trexler, 4 N.C. 188 (1815).
,z State v. Tuttle, 145 N.C. 487, 488, 59 S.E. 542 (1907).
1962]
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be a trespass with a strong hand, 3 or manu forti,44 or it must be
described with some other term suggesting force sufficient to breach
the peace.45 A special verdict must also contain a finding of strong-
handed force, and a finding only of "stratagem and fraud" will not
suffice.4" On the question of quantum of force the cases on forcible
trespasses to real and personal property should be interchangeable
and are so cited by the court.
The sufficiency of proof of force depends upon the quantum of
force required to cause a breach of the peace. No case has ever
said that putting in fear is itself a breach of the peace. On the
contrary, there is some discussion of actual and constructive breaches
of the peace. In State v. Love,47 for example, the court said that
the trespass must "manifestly and directly tend to" a breach of the
peace. It would seem more economical of terms to permit a
breach of the peace to be proved whether the force involved has been
actual force--i.e., touching either person or property forcibly, or
only constructive force-i.e., fear of an imminent forcible and
trespassory touching.
A forcible trespass is sufficiently forcible whether an actual
violent touching is trespassory to the person"8 or only to property in
the person's presence.4" Both rules are entirely sound. Surely a
battery will qualify as evidence of strong-handed force, and a strong-
handed trespass to property in the victim's presence is equally an
assault upon the untouched but frightened victim.
The troublesome cases are those in which there has been no
touching, but at most only an assault. Are these breaches of the
peace? For example, an unlawful assembly by three persons accom-
panied by acts of violence constitutes a riot at common law, and
surely a riot is a breach of the peace. Therefore the court con-
cluded in State v. Simpson50 that the trespass by four men upon
the possession of two women must be not less than a riot, and hence
that it was sufficient force to sustain a conviction of forcible trespass.
"'E.g., State v. Simpson, 12 N.C. 504 (1828).
" State v. Flowers, 6 N.C. 225 (1813).
"'See, e.g., State v. Armfield, 27 N.C. 207 (1844); State v. Love, 19
N.C. 267 (1837); State v. Mills, 13 N.C. 420 (1830).
State v. Ray, 32 N.C. 39, 40 (1849).
,719 N.C. 267, 268 (1837).
,8 State v. Trexler, 4 N.C. 188 (1815).
'9 State v. Pearman, 61 N.C. 371 (1867); State v. Drake, 60 N.C. 238(1864).
12 N.C. 504 (1828).
[Vol. 40
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Although it would have have been more elegant reasoning for the
court to use riot only by analogy, this opinion did establish at an
early date that force could be proved without proving a battery.
The conventional way of charging a breach of the peace in the
absence of any trespassory touching of the person is to charge the
use of constructive force, that is, fear; and it is no defense that no
actual force was applied: "[A]cts of extreme violence, as robbery,
are sometimes committed under a very civil appearance."'" When
the victim could achieve nothing but harm to himself by offering
futile resistance, he may properly do nothing, so long as his for-
bidding is sufficiently plain to render trespassory the interference
with his property.
Particular circumstances may influence whether a particular
course of conduct arouses reasonable fear in a reasonable person.
Factors such as the weight of numbers,'- men against women,"'
and whites against Negroes 54 create situations in which words alone,
or words accompanied by actions on a comparatively modest scale,
may assume menacing aspects outside of their ordinary appearances.
The offer of force sought to be proved must be real. There is no
forcible trespass by weight of numbers or offer of force "where they
neither put the owner in fear, nor provoke him to an immediate
redress of his wrong by force, nor excite him to protect the posses-
sion of his chattel by personal prowess . . . 2 5 Words alone do not
constitute force unless they amount to threats of violence or lead
to a demonstration of force.5" Likewise fraud is not force. If a
person is deceived into surrendering his property on the strength of
a purported warrant, which it appears will be backed up by force in
its execution, this is no forcible trespass unless and until the force
is about to be brought into action.5" But a forcible refusal to show
the warrant in such a case, because it vitiates the lawfulness of the
execution, would justify a conviction of forcible trespass.5" Anct
rl Id. at 506.
"2 See State v. McAdden, 71 N.C. 207 (1874); State v. Armfield, 27
N.C. 207 (1844); State v. Simpson, 12 N.C. 504 (1828).
"See State v. Tuttle, 145 N.C. 487, 59 S.E. 542 (1907) ; State v. Gray,
109 N.C. 790, 14 S.E. 55 (1891); State v. Simpson, supra note 52.
" See, e.g., State v. McAdden, 71 N.C. 207 (1874).
" State v. Mills, 13 N.C. 420, 423 (1830).
"l State v. Tuttle, 145 N.C. 487, 59 S.E. 542 (1907) ; State v. Gray, 109"
N.C. 790, 14 S.E. 55 (1891); State v. King, 74 N.C. 177 (1876).
"' State v. Barefoot, 89 N.C. 565 (1883) ; State v. Armfield, 27 N.C. 207'(1844).
"' State v. Armfield, supra note 57.
1962]
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when the victim knows the warrant is only a sham to cover the tres-
passory taking of his property with such force as need be, the court
will not require a forbidding carried so far as to be an offer of re-
sistance. "9
Finally, it has been clearly laid down that in forcible trespass,
unlike the doctrine in robbery, the victim need suffer only the force
implicit in an assault; he need not also be put in fear. The breach of
the public peace is the same, whether the victim fights, falls back, or
flees in the face of a threatened trespass, and the court has applied,
though not stated, the "reasonable man" test with regard to fear in
the presence of overwhelming force: "It is only necessary that the
force should be such as was calculated to intimidate or alarm or in-
volve or tend to a breach of the peace.""0
Trespass: The Personal Property
The types of personal property involved in forcible trespass
prosecutions have been as miscellaneous as a mail-order catalog."'
Just as it is important to avoid a variance between pleading and proof
as to real and personal property,62 there must be no significant
variance between the object named in the indictment and the object
proved to have been taken. 3 Apparently forcible trespass can even
be charged in connection with the indirect taking of intangible prop-
" State v. Barefoot, 89 N.C. 565 (1883).
" State v. Pearman, 61 N.C. 371, 373 (1867). (Emphasis is by the
court.)
" Banknote: State v. Trexler, 4 N.C. 188 (1815) ; promissory note: State
v. Ray, 32 N.C. 39 (1849); due bill: State v. Gray, 109 N.C. 790, 14 S.E.
55 (1891); slaves: State v. Armfield, 27 N.C. 207 (1844); State v. Mills,
13 N.C. 420 (1830); State v. McDowell, 8 N.C. 449 (1821); State v.
Flowers, 6 N.C. 225 (1813); State v. White, 2 N.C. 13 (Super. Ct. 1792);
horses: State v. Lutz, 65 N.C. 503 (1871); State v. Elrod, 28 N.C. 250
(1846); State v. Love, 19 N.C. 267 (1837); State v. Arrington, 7 N.C.
571 (1819); inule: State v. Tatom, 69 N.C. 35 (1873); cow: State v. Mc-
Adden, 71 N.C. 207 (1874); hog: State v. Barefoot, 89 N.C. 565 (1883);
dogs: State v. Bogue, 31 N.C. 360 (1849); State v. Phipps, 32 N.C. 17
(1848); deer: State v. Hemphill, 20 N.C. 241 (1838); sword: State v.
Sowls, 61 N.C. 151 (1867); bolt of cloth: State v. King, 74 N.C. 177
(1876) ; bale of cotton: State v. Marsh, 64 N.C. 378 (1870) ; corn: State v.
Drake, 60 N.C. 238 (1864); fodder: State v. Surles, 74 N.C. 330 (1876);
blue stone: State v. Pearman, supra note 60; truck: State v. Stinnett, 203
N.C. 829, 167 S.E. 63 (1933).
"2 State v. Graves, 74 N.C. 396 (1876).
" In State v. Hemphill, 20 N.C. 241 (1838), the indictment named a slain
deer whose carcass by agreement belonged to the defendant; the object
proved taken was the severed deerskin, which by the same agreement be-
longed to the prosecutor. This was held a fatal variance between pleading
and proof.
[Vol. 40
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erty. In State v. Tuttle6 4 the defendant had given the prosecutrix
a note and chattel mortgage for one hundred dollars. He went to
her, threatened and cursed her, and procured an order signed by her
directing the register of deeds to cancel the mortgage, which was
duly cancelled. The aspect of assault was plain; just what property
was taken away from the prosecutrix was also plain-a chose in
action worth one hundred dollars; but it is most doubtful that pro-
curing the discharge of a debt by force would constitute robbery
even today, because no tangible thing was both taken and carried
away.
More than a hundred years ago forcible trespass could be used
where neither larceny nor robbery could be charged, because the
rules of "property the subject of larceny" did not confine forcible
trespass. Real property was not the subject of larceny; but literally
dozens of cases have been reported on forcible trespass to real prop-
erty. A banknote, being the evidence of a chose in action, could not
be the subject of robbery because it was intangible, and even its
trifling value as paper was said to be merged in the chose in action
which it represented. But since the banknote was capable of being
possessed, it was personal property very much the subject of forcible
trespass.65 Today most of the limitations upon the subject of
larceny, products of the days when larceny was a capital felony, have
been removed by statute. However, statutes declaring gambling
machines and non tax-paid liquor to be contraband and without prop-
erty interests have raised a similar problem: does it violate the spirit
of the statutes to sustain a conviction for larceny of contraband?
Most decisions have simply smothered the question in judicial com-
mon sense-yes, it is larceny. 6  But it would be more workman-
like, if the question arose in North Carolina, to say that because title
is irrelevant in forcible trespass, so is the statutory denial of prop-
erty rights. Hence forcible trespasses to contraband could at least
cover the worst forms of the crimes involving contraband, such as
hijacking and other forms of robbery.
Trespass: Possession and Title
"Possession" has been defined as a neutral term representing the
physical fact of peaceful possession without any aspect or hint of
,145 N.C. 487, 59 S.E. 542 (1907).
"State v. Trexler, 4 N.C. 188 (1815). Other cases dealing with similar
subject matter have not even raised this question.
" E.g, State v. Johnson, 77 Idaho 1, 287 P.2d 425 (1955).
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title. What constitutes a trespass to personal property involves the
contemplation of what sorts of acts constitute the wrongful inter-
ference with the usual incidents of possession, which are principally
continued possession and use. Taking and carrying away is the
most obvious form of interference with possession in forcible tres-
pass, and most of the cases involve this type of trespass. Damaging
property is another form of trespass.17  Interference with the use of
a chattel is the mildest form of trespass found in these cases."8 As
a practical matter, any interference with the possession of personal
property on the possessor's real property becomes magnified because
the very entry may become trespassory: a trespass to real property
aggravates the whole proceeding and increases the likelihood of a
breach of the peace.""
The trespasser has offered his title to personal property as a
defense in several cases. This defense never succeeds because title
is irrelevant no matter how well established. The very first case in
North Carolina involved the taking and carrying away of slaves
by order of the owner, who was in South Carolina. Judge Williams
of the superior court excluded evidence of title, viewing the question
as one of protecting the peaceful possession of property in North
Carolina, and he insisted that title be tried out in civil actions, not
by forcible self-help." Claims of right to crops by tenant farmers
and sharecroppers have also produced forcible trespass cases, 1 and
so has an ostensible tenancy in common.72 In all of the cases the
court has followed the line of reasoning laid out in the earliest case:
peaceful possession is ten points of the law of forcible trespass;
disputes over title are to be litigated in the civil courts alone; title is
no defense to forcible trespass.
Justifications
The reasonable and timely use of force in defending or re-
"' State v. Phipps, 32 N.C. 17 (1848) (shooting a dog).
"E.g., State v. Tuttle, 145 N.C. 487, 59 S.E. 542 (1907); State v.
Tre-xler, 4 N.C. 188 (1815).
"See State v. Pearman, 61 N.C. 371 (1867); State v. Trexler, supra
note 68.
o State v. White, 2 N.C. 13 (Super. Ct. 1792).
"' State v. Austin, 123 N.C. 749, 31 S.E. 731 (1898) (dictum); State
v. Surles, 74 N.C. 330 (1876).
" State v. Pearman, 61 N.C. 371 (1867). And since felonious intent
is not an element of forcible trespass, the absence of felonious intent shown
by acknowledgment of the victim's title was held in Pearman to be no de-
fense.
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acquiring the possession of property in what amounts to an affray
is neither a trespass nor an assault, provided the force is reasonably
proportioned to the need and does not result in serious bodily injury
or death;"a hence this force needs no justification. But forcibly to
repossess one's property from a peaceful possessor, no matter how
wrongful his possession may be or how forcibly it was acquired,
is itself a forcible trespass without justification.74 Here forcible
trespass offers a handy solution for an otherwise knotty problem
in the law of robbery. If a man uses force to repossess his own
property, he can hardly be said to have felonious intent, and there
are cases elsewhere than North Carolina which hold that such a
forcible repossession does not constitute robberyY5 This misconduct
can be punished as a forcible trespass, however, because felonious
intent-the element missing in robbery-is not an element of
forcible trespassY
The only legitimate justification for the use of force in taking
possession of personal property is the execution of legal process,
fieri facias. As long as the place of execution is not a dwelling
house," such force as is necessary is justified if the writ is valid,
even though the motive of the officer making the execution is bad,"
and even if the sheriff makes a mistake in good faith as to the correct
ownership of the property."9 The process authorizing the levy can
be fairly informal, and the forcible taking of a horse in satisfaction
of a tax claim has been justified even though the deputy sheriff in-
volved carried only a list of persons and property with him, not a
copy of the list filed in the clerk of court's office, where it had the
force of a judgment.8" Only if the process is void on its face is the
levying officer not justified in executing it."1
' Curlee v. Scales, 200 N.C. 612, 158 S.E. 89 (1931); State v. Austin,
123 N.C. 749, 31 S.E. 731 (1898).
'State v. Flowers, 6 N.C. 225 (1813) (dictum).
E.g., People v. Rosen, 11 Cal. 2d 147, 78 P.2d 727 (1938).
STo be sure, a solution in robbery terms offers one benefit to law en-
forcement: robbery is a felony, whereas forcible trespass is only a mis-
demeanor. Unfortunately for the theory put forth, no case has used it either
in North Carolina or elsewhere.
" See Sharpe, Forcible Trespass to Real Property, 39 N.C.L. REv. 121,
142 (1961).
78 State v. Elrod, 28 N.C. 250 (1846).
State v. Tatom, 69 N.C. 35 (1873).80 State v. Lutz, 65 N.C. 503 (1871).
State v. Barefoot, 89 N.C. 565 (1883). See also Sharpe, supra note
77, at 142.
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COMPARISONS, COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS
Merger and Lesser Included Offenses
By applying the doctrines of merger and lesser included offenses,
forcible trespass to personal property can be compared with some of
its close relatives, particularly larceny, robbery, and assault. It has
been said that forcible trespass is merged in robbery, provided the
article taken is the subject of larceny." By the same token, forcible
trespass ought to be a lesser included offense to robbery in several
situations: when the article taken is not the subject of larceny ;"3 when
the article is only trespassed upon, not taken away;4 when there
is no felonious intent;'5 when the taking precedes the force
or fear ;6 or possibly when the taking is not lucri causa.87
Forcible trespass is not, however, a lesser included offense to
larceny, because even though a trespass is included in every crime
against property, the trespass included is not automatically a crim-
inal trespass: the trespass included in larceny is vi et armis, and
that will not suffice in a forcible trespass indictment."'
The Great Larceny Fiasco, 1857-1889
Forcible trespass to personal property has never included the
vital element in larceny and its kindred crimes, felonious intent.
For this reason, it has been possible to prosecute for forcible tres-
pass in barefaced and defiant trespasses under claim of right in
which no larceny or robbery charge could be brought. 9 But the
availability of forcible trespass in this situation seems to have de-
flected the law of larceny for a time in the mid-nineteenth century,
so that secrecy actually became an element of larceny.
The source of this unfortunate doctrine apparently was a high-
way robbery case"° in which Justice Pearson attempted to con-
82 State v. Trexler, 4 N.C. 188 (1815).
8 Ibid.
8' State v. Phipps, 32 N.C. 17 (1848).
8 State v. Surles, 74 N.C. 330 (1876) ; State v. White, 2 N.C. 13 (Super.
Ct. 1792).
88 State v. Love, 19 N.C. 267 (1837). See also State v. John, 50 N.C.
164 (1857).
State v. Deal, 64 N.C. 270, 277 (1870) (dissent).
88 State v. Stinnett, 203 N.C. 829, 167 S.E. 63 (1933). See also State
v. Arrington, 7 N.C. 571 (1819). In 1819 conviction of a misdemeanor
could not follow upon an indictment for a felony, but this rule has long since
been changed.8 E.g., State v. Surles, 74 N.C. 330 (1876).
"0 State v. John, 50 N.C. 164 (1857).
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fine robbery to takings from the victim accomplished by force or
fear, leaving to larceny takings accomplished by force directed solely
against the property itself (larceny from the person), or takings
accomplished by stealth but defended thereafter with force (larceny
followed by assault). Justice Battle in effect dissented, showing
the dangers involved in the distinction offered, but he concurred in
the result so as to award the defendant a speedy new trial."°  As
Chief Justice, Pearson went further in concurring in a robbery
case ten years later, saying: "Forcible trespass is the taking by force
the personal property of another. Robbery is the fraudulent taking
[i.e., with felonious intent] by force the personal property of an-
other."'" This left larceny as the secret taking of personal property
with felonious intent, and in State v. Deal,"2 this time speaking for
the court, Chief Justice Pearson laid down the rule that secrecy
indeed was an element of larceny. Justice Rodman, grandfather
of the present Justice, dissented, arguing quite correctly that secrecy
of taking was evidence of felonious intent, but that openness of
taking, while tending to disprove felonious intent, was not conclusive
against it.92a Today Deal would be disposed of through the doctrine
of larceny by trick : Deal had acquired possession of a promissory
note by pretending to examine it and had prevented the holder from
recovering it by a show of force; however, Chief Justice Pearson
apparently believed that a trick was not a larceny."'
No sooner had the secrecy element been imposed by Deal in 1870
than its operation began to be limited. The following year a con-
viction of larceny for the open rolling of a drunk, conscious but in-
capacitated, was affirmed,"5 distinguishing Deal on the claim of
o Id. at 170 (separate opinion).
"State v. Sowls, 61 N.C. 151, 157 (1867).
9264 N.C. 270 (1870).
°02 Id. at 275.
"E.g., The King v. Pear, 1 Leach 212, 168 Eng. Rep. 208 (K.B. 1779).
"State v. Deal, 64 N.C. 270, 274 (1870). The term "larceny by trick"
does not seem to have been used in any North Carolina case, although the
principle of larceny from obtaining possession by means of a lie was men-
tioned in State v. England, 53 N.C. 399 (1861), and was used to affirm a
conviction of larceny in State v. Scott, 64 N.C. 586 (1870), decided in the
June term; Deal had been decided at the January term the same year. State
v. Bryant, 74 N.C. 124 (1876), contained a learned discussion of the rationale
of larceny by trick but still refused to use the term itself. State v. McRae,
111 N.C. 665, 16 S.E. 173 (1892), used the expression "trick or deception."
Later cases have followed this practice. E.g., State v. Lyerly, 169 N.C. 377,
85 S.E. 302 (1915) ; State v. Ruffin, 164 N.C. 416, 79 S.E. 417 (1913).
" State v. Jackson, 65 N.C. 305 (1871).
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right in that case and the incapacity of the victim in this. A year
later Chief Justice Pearson had to strain to find secrecy in the
working of the tobacco-box trick, an ancient confidence game, in
order to affirm a larceny conviction. This was a serious problem
-the victim's money was snatched out of his hands and the thief
simply outran him. This was not robbery or forcible trespass; if it
was not larceny, it was only a civil trespass-a result which could
not be tolerated. Justice Boyden in the same year insisted that
"the property must be taken feloniously, that is, fraudulently and
secretly, so as not only to deprive the owner of the property, but
also of the knowledge of the taker .... "9 Justice Rodman duti-
fully distinguished Deal in 1874 by holding that the taking of a hog
in the presence of a stranger was still secret as to the hog's owner
and therefore was a larceny.9" The zenith (or nadir) of this series
of cases came in 1875 in a case appealed because the trial judge had
left to the jury the question whether or not secrecy was an element of
larceny. This was plainly error and the supreme court awarded
a new trial. Without citing a single case in its entire opinion, the
court did suggest that the capture and consumption of stray chickens
from next door did not show felonious intent. 0
Fourteen years later State v. Powel 00 effectively, but without
saying so, overruled Deal, relying heavily upon Justice Rodman's
dissent in Deal. The defendant, who was well known to the victim,
snatched away the victim's money without a pretense of claim of
right. The defendant's companion held the victim to prevent re-
taking, and the defendant threatened to kill the victim if he followed.
A larceny conviction was affirmed. Thereafter the overruling of
Deal became regarded as a settled doctrine,10' and in a later chicken-
stealing case, Powell was regarded as restoring the rule that open-
ness of taking was only evidence tending to rebut felonious intent.1"'
This view of secrecy in larceny has persisted and has not sub-
sequently been disturbed."'
State v. Henderson, 66 N.C. 627 (1872).
9, State v. Ledford, 67 N.C. 60, 62 (1872).
98 State v. Fisher, 70 N.C. 78 (1874).
9o State v. Gaither, 72 N.C. 458 (1875).
100 103 N.C. 424, 9 S.E. 627 (1889).
10. State v. Hill, 114 N.C. 780, 18 S.E. 971 (1894).
102 State v. Coy, 119 N.C. 901, 26 S.E. 120 (1896).
.. E.g., State v. Holder, 188 N.C. 561, 125 S.E. 113 (1924).
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Forcible Trespass as a Civil Action
The study of forcible trespass would not be complete without
some attention to the fairly recent use which has been made of the
term in civil actions. The actions themselves have been generally
for assault, but they have possessed certain characteristics which
make them strongly akin to the crime of forcible trespass: strong-
handed force or fear; some connection with property, real or per-
sonal; and generally the twin aspects of bare-facedness rather than
stealth, and some claim of right, ranging from a disputed right of
way to complete title. This usage of forcible trespass in civil actions
cannot be termed "improper," and even if it were so called, it would
still be law. Analytically the usage seems to be another manifesta-
tion of disapproval of strong-handed trespasses, rather than a cause
of action separate from assault and battery. As such, the civil
action for forcible trespass is no more startling or illogical than the
division of the crime of forcible trespass into personal and real prop-
erty compartments.
The civil action for forcible trespass originated in 1890 with
Mosseller v. Deaver.104 The court there ruled that a criminal action
for the strong-handed eviction of a tenant from a house, "a forcible
entry under the statute [of forcible entry and detainer], if not in-
deed an indictable forcible trespass,"'0 5 supported a civil action for
damages, adopting the then English position. 0 6 The court held
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover nominal damages for the
trespass and compensatory damages for actual harm to his person
and personal property, and it said, "There may also be awarded
exemplary damage if the unlawful act be done in a wanton and
reckless manner.' 10 7  The plaintiff was awarded a new trial in
which the jury would be instructed that "the forcible entry was
")108unlawful, without reference to the amount of force necessary ....
Between Mosseller and the next case in a direct line, North
Carolina made two important enlargements in its tort law. It
accepted demonstrable nervous injuries as compensable harms.'
104 106 N.C. 494, 11 S.E. 529 (1890).
101Id. at 495, 11 S.E. at 530. See also Sharpe, supra note 77, at 136.
'Newton v. Harland, 1 Man. & G. 644, 133 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1840).
Newton was overruled by Hemmings v. Stoke Poges Golf Club, Ltd., [1920]
1 IKB. 720 (C.A. 1919), discussed in Note, 36 L.Q. Rmv. 204 (1920).
'
07Mosseller v. Deaver, 106 N.C. 494, 498, 11 S.E. 529, 530 (1890).
108 Ibid.
' oKimberly v. Howland, 143 N.C. 398, 55 S.E. 778 (1906).
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It also allowed punitive or exemplary damages for intentional assault
without any touching which resulted in such nervous injuries;...
and at the same term the court heard the first appeal to test the
punitive damages aspect of Mosseller. Workmen for a telegraph
company on its right of way intentionally and most obnoxiously
bothered a pregnant woman, entering her home against her forbid-
ding and causing her definite physical injuries. She was awarded
punitive damages. The court viewed the case as a trespass ab initio
to real property, accompanied by foreseeable consequential physical
injuries to the plaintiff."- Nothing was said about forcible trespass,
however.
In the next case" 2 an assault and battery arose when the defend-
ant drove off a cow with the plaintiff hanging onto its chain, dragging
the plaintiff under a barbed wire fence and causing her to miscarry.
There was a genuine dispute over the extent of the plaintiff's right to
tie the cow where it was and possibly over the defendant's right to
distrain the cow for damages, but the defendant used excessive force
under the circumstances:
The cows, being securely tied to trees, were in the actual
possession and under the immediate personal control of the
plaintiff and her mother-in-law, and it was a forcible trespass
to take them away against their will, they being present and
forbidding.l 2 a
Not only is the language of the opinion that of criminal forcible
trespass, but Chief Justice Clark also used the term and cited criminal
cases in support of his decision.
During and after the Depression, over-zealous repossessions and
evictions gave rise to a few civil forcible trespass cases. The gen-
eral rationale of the action received some attention, but it was not
worked out to a satisfactory scheme. The aspects of force were
applied directly from the criminal law, however:
Where there is such a show of force as to create a reason-
able apprehension in the mind of the one in possession of
premises that he must yield to. avoid a breach of the peace,
.10 Saunders v. Gilbert, 156 N.C. 463, 72 S.E. 610 (1911).
.. May v. Western Union Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 416, 72 S.E. 1059 (1911).
'"Kirkpatrick v. Crutchfield, 178 N.C. 348, 100 S.E. 602 (1919).11 2
4 Id. at 350, 100 S.E. at 605.
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and he does so yield, this is yielding upon force, and consti-
tutes forceable [sic] trespass." 3
And the force must tend to a breach of the peace: words alone, un-
accompanied by threats, were not enough.
1 14
Although the damages rules were firmly established, the name
and identity of the cause of action were not. For example, it was
variously called "civil action to recover damages for alleged forcable
trespass" ;"5 "assault and forceable tresspass" ;1O and finally "civil
action for willful trespass to the person.""17  Perhaps the direction
of the terminology suggests the eventual fate of civil forcible tres-
pass: merger in civil assault. Indeed Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores
Corp."' probably marked the end of forcible trespass as a distinct
cause of action. No later case has turned upon its identity or has
been labelled by the term, although the term itself has been used
fairly recently to describe assaults civil and criminal."' Perhaps
Chief Justice Stacy expressed in Kirby the feeling which led to the
disappearance of civil forcible trespass as a cause of action in itself:
It is true, the basis of the action in most of the cases has
been forcible trespass, and it is contended that in the case at
bar no forcible trespass has been shown, hence no liability
exists. Without conceding the correctness of the syllogism as
applied to the instant case, it is observed that much of the
confusion on the subject seems to have come from worship-
ping at the shrine of words and formulas, rather than apply-
ing correct principles to the facts in hand. 20
It may be that since Kirby no plaintiff's attorney has felt that he
really needed forcible trespass.
..3 Freeman v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 205 N.C. 257, 258, 171
S.E. 63, 64 (1933), discussed in Notes, 47 HARv. L. REv. 884 (1934); 12
N.C.L. REv. 154 (1934).
... Kaylor v. Sain, 207 N.C. 312, 176 S.E. 560 (1934); Anthony v.
Teachers Protective Union, 206 N.C. 7, 173 S.E. 6 (1934).
"'Freeman v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 205 N.C. 257, 171 S.E.
63 (1933).
... Anthony v. Teachers Protective Union, 206 N.C. 7, 173 S.E. 6 (1934).
" Martin v. Spencer, 221 N.C. 28, 18 S.E.2d 703 (1942); Kirby v.
Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936).18 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936).
1.9 Binder v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N.C. 512, 23 S.E.2d
894 (1942) (semble); and see State v. Goodson, 235 N.C. 177, 69 S.E.2d
242 0 N1952).
• °210 N.C. at 812, 188 S.E. at 627.
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CONCLUSION
A year ago this writer bemoaned the unnoticed eclipse of forcible
trespass to real property. 2' Is there any reason to mourn the
disuse of forcible trespass to personal property? Probably not as
a practical matter. Unlike the several crimes against real property,
criminal trespasses to personal property are now well covered with-
out forcible trespass: the antique refinements of things subject to
larceny have been done away with by statute, and only the area
of robbery without felonious intent might seem to be covered better
by forcible trespass. Had North Carolina been tardy in awarding
damages and even punitive damages for fright without impact or
physical harm, the civil cause of action for forcible trespass might
have become firmly established. This, however, has not been the
case, and actions for civil assaults can accomplish all that the plain-
tiff needs.
Still forcible trespass to personal property is more than a his-
torical curiosity: its acceptance and development demonstrate the
common law at its most adaptable, filling lacunae in the common law
of crimes until legislation took over, and serving especially in times
of civil unrest 22 to aid in suppressing the open lawlessness threat-
ening the fabric of society. Perhaps the crime is not so much dead
as dormant, the need for it having abated. This, then, is no
obituary. Forcible trespass to personal property has never been
overruled, merged, or even disapproved.' 23 It is a good weapon to
have in reserve.
121 See Sharpe, supra note 77, at 152.
122 Upwards of half of the opinions on forcible trespass bear dates between
1860 and 1885, for example.
122 Forcible trespass was still a crime in good standing in its latest affirmed
conviction. State v. Tuttle, 145 N.C. 487, 59 S.E. 542 (1907).
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